Abstract
with great levels of uncertainty. In the following paragraphs we provide a brief outline of the 'deterrence' and 'humanitarian' narratives, focusing on the main actors, arguments and proposed solutions as well as the way in which they employ the discourse of crisis to argue for changes in European migration policy.
In the deterrence narrative, which is the dominant discourse among European authorities and agencies such as Frontex, the term 'crisis' is mainly used to refer to the number of arrivals and Europe's perceived inability to accommodate them. Irregular migrants are seen as a burden on European societies as well as a potential security risk, an unspecified threat that needs to be contained through the erection of fences and other obstacles (Bauman, 2016; Mainwaring, 2016) . Proponents of this view tend to frame border deaths as the result of Europe's inability to control its external borders and prevent irregular migration. Indeed, European authorities have strategically employed the discourse of crisis and the need to prevent further deaths to legitimize increasingly drastic deterrence measures, such as the repatriation agreement with Turkey (den Heijer et al., 2016) . Consequently, "the hardships migrants face can be turned around to label control measures protective and benevolent" (Carling and Hernández-Carretero, 2011) , whereas more welcoming measures are discredited as encouraging further risky crossings. An extreme example of this perspective is German far-right parliamentarian Beatrix von Storch, who suggested that migrant deaths should be blamed on Angela Merkel's overly tolerant refugee policy (Die Welt, 2016) . Similar arguments have been employed by Frontex and others, however, in their criticism of humanitarian search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean (Heller and Pezzani, 2017) .
The second narrative, mainly espoused by humanitarian organizations and human rights groups, sees deterrence as the cause of the increasing death toll, rather than as a solution. It is argued that 'Fortress Europe's' policy of securitization and closure is the main reason for the occurrence of border deaths, because in the absence of safe and legal passages people are forced to undertake dangerous sea crossings. Proponents of this view see the 'migrant crisis' primarily through a humanitarian lens, emphasizing the Europe's moral and legal responsibility towards refugees and people in need. This applies first and foremost to the need to rescue people at sea, but also extends to addressing the underlying factors that force people to risk their life at sea.
Most humanitarian agencies and human rights proponents share the view that more humane migration laws and a less restrictive border policy, in combination with addressing the root causes of global migration, will reduce and eventually remove the need for irregular migration (see Cuttita (2017) and Scott-Smith (2016) for a more in-depth analysis):
"To stop more tragedies at sea, Europe's leaders (…) should offer refugees safe ways to seek asylum in Europe, so people won't see the sea as their only route to safety.
Nobody should have to die just to cross a border, and every life lost at sea is a life too many" (Amnesty International, 2015a) .
By emphasizing the political causes of the humanitarian crisis, organisations such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) explicitly challenge the dominant deterrence narrative:
"Europe cannot continue to count on the deadly sea crossing, fences and poor reception conditions to act as a 'filter of deterrence'. The current narrative and policies cannot hold" (Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2015: 5) .
Border deaths have thus become more than a human tragedy: they have become a central focus in the contentious debates surrounding migration and borders that currently engulf most of the Western world. Yet, perhaps because of the ideological and polarized nature of the issue, the debate is often devoid of factual information. In part, this is due to a lack of data: neither the EU nor its border states keep records on migrants who died or went missing in the attempt to cross EU borders, and Frontex data on monthly arrivals was not made publicly available until recently.
As a result, we used to know little about questions of major humanitarian and political relevance, such as:
 How many migrants have died, both in absolute terms and relative to the number of people that attempted the crossing?
 How do mortality risks differ between routes and over time?
 How does border policy affect border deaths?
This has changed somewhat in recent times, with the publication of investigative reports by various international organizations and advocacy groups (Amnesty International, 2015b; Brian and Laczko, 2014; Cosgrave et al., 2016; Dearden et al., 2016; Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2015) . These reports and policy briefs seek to investigate, and draw attention to, the magnitude and scope of the humanitarian crisis currently unfolding at Europe's Mediterranean border, although they also tend to provide a somewhat fragmented picture, covering limited data sources, time frames and geographical areas.
The academic literature on the border deaths hardly engages with this newly available empirical data on sea arrivals and mortality 5 . Most scholarly work related to migrant death instead focuses on migration policy (Patalano, 2015; Tazzioli, 2016) , its international (human rights) law implications (Follis, 2015; Grant, 2011; Trevisanut, 2014) , or the lived experiences of individual migrants and aid workers (del Valle, 2016; Scott-Smith, 2016; Squire et al., 2017) .
We believe that each of these areas could benefit from a more comprehensive treatment of statistical data.
5 Among the notable exceptions are the works of Carling (Carling, 2007; Carling and Hernández-Carretero, 2011), Cattaneo & D'Amico (2016) and the Amsterdam-based research team led by Last et al., 2016; Spijkerboer, 2013) . These will be discussed in more detail below.
This study therefore seeks to collate, summarize and assess recent empirical data on trends and dynamics of migrant deaths in the Mediterranean Sea. In doing so, we critically evaluate some of the underlying assumptions of the narratives described above, including the 'pull factor hypothesis'. Moreover, by pointing interested readers to the most recent and accurate data available and providing analytical templates, we prepare the ground for urgently needed further research and monitoring.
The structure of this paper is threefold. First, we describe the available data sources on border deaths and migrant arrivals, and assess their scope and reliability. Second, we provide a systematic analysis on Mediterranean border deaths from 2010 to 2016, collating data from multiple sources. By combining sea arrivals and fatality statistics, we calculate absolute and relative mortality rates, by route and over time-including the most recent data (until December 2016). Third, we discuss the policy implications of the observed mortality patterns, particularly in relation to European border policy.
Border Deaths in the Mediterranean: Data Availability and Statistics 2000-2016

Recording border deaths
Counting the number of 'missing migrants' gives us an idea of the sheer scale of the humanitarian crisis, and can serve as an impetus for policy change (Last et al., 2017) . Since neither the EU nor its member states keep a centralized register of dead or missing migrants, a number of organisations have sought to compile databases on migrant fatalities (see Appendix of border deaths than the previously discussed sources.
Although each of these data sources contribute to our understanding of migrant mortality in the Mediterranean, they also suffer from a number of limitations (Laczko et al., 2016 Part of the variation in death tolls, both over time and between routes, is due to fluctuations in the number of migrants. The number of crossings is highly volatile and responsive to push-and pull factors in the respective countries of departure and destination (De Bruycker et al., 2013; Fargues and Bonfanti, 2014) . The total number of deaths in a given region or period does therefore not provide much information about the actual risk involved in crossing. In the next section, we will compare the number of deaths to the number of migrants attempting the crossing.
Arrival data and patterns
In order to calculate the relative risk involved in forced migration, we need to know the number of fatalities as well as the number of people that attempted the crossing. Data on arrivals is collated and provided by various organizations, notably the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), the IOM and the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) (see Appendix Table 2 ).
All three organizations provide information on migrant sea arrivals in Europe. Yet, as IOM "harmonizes" the data of the Migration Flows Europe page with the UNCHR portal, these two
should not be understood as alternative sources. Both provide data on arrivals as of 2014.
Information provided includes the nationality of migrants as well as the date and country of arrival. UNHCR also provides a breakdown by age (minor/adult) and gender. Frontex records 'detections of illegal border crossings' since 2009, based on data provided by member states.
The Frontex database is the official source on migrant arrivals in Europe and covers the longest time period, which is why the analyses presented in this study are based on this data 7 . 
The risk of crossing
By combining data on the number of fatalities and the number of arrivals, we can calculate relative risks or mortality rates. The mortality rate represents the actual risk involved in crossing, and can thereby provide an important contribution to our understanding of irregular migration. Following Carling (2007), we define the mortality rate (MR) as:
where D is the number of attempted crossings in year t and route r, and F is the corresponding number of fatalities. Because D is not observed, it is approximated by the number of arrivals plus the observed number of fatalities. Using the above methodology, the overall MR in the period for which we have data (2009-2016) was 8.75 per 1,000 attempted crossings, or 1 out of 114. Moreover, by calculating the MR in this way, we can observe how the risk involved in crossing differs between routes and time periods. Before doing so, however, we would like to point out a number of limitations that need to be taken into account in their application and interpretation.
First, to calculate relative risks, one needs reliable information on both the number of migrants that attempt the crossing and the number that die in the attempt. As described above, however, data on border deaths and irregular border crossings is by definition incomplete and subject to measurement error. It is likely that the number of deaths and missing migrants (the numerator) is underestimated to a larger extent than the number of attempted crossings (the denominator).
The mortality rates presented in this paper thus provide a lower bound, and the actual risk of crossing is probably higher. That being said, as long as the methodology for data collection is consistent across time and space, there is no reason to assume time trends or relative differences (e.g. between routes) will be biased 8 . Second, because migrants generally attempt the crossing in groups rather than alone, mortality risks are not statistically independent: the survival chances of migrants crossing in the same boat are highly correlated. As a result, mortality statistics calculated over a short period may be biased by one or more high-casualty accidents, and not reflect the actual risk faced by migrants during that period (or, vice versa, the absence of deaths in a given timeframe does not necessarily imply that the risk was zero). This problem becomes more pronounced when 1) migrants travel in larger boats, and thus the degree of 'clustering' is higher and 2) the number of attempted crossings is smaller.
Consequently, mortality statistics that cover short time periods or periods with few attempted crossings should be treated with caution, because they may not be reflective of longer-term trends. When applied in an inappropriate way, mortality rates can easily lead to misguided conclusions and policy prescriptions. We therefore advise that they should always be supported by in-depth case studies and contextual knowledge. Moreover, they should be based on the most accurate data available and calculated over extended periods of time.
Taking these caveats into account, we calculated mortality rates by year and route, and plotted them in Figure 3 . Figure 3 shows that mortality rates strongly differ between routes. The eastern route has consistently been the least dangerous, and the central route the most dangerous. In peak year 2015, the risk of dying on the central route was over 19 times higher than on the Eastern route (15.4 vs. 0.83 out of 1,000 crossings). The reasons for these differences lie in the length of the routes and means of operation of smugglers (Dearden et al., 2016; Pastore et al., 2006 ).
Contrary to Fargues & Bonfanti (2014) , who argued that relative risks continuously increased between 1998 and 2014, we find no clear time trend in the overall MR. Instead, it appears that crossing has always involved a high risk, particularly on the central and western routes, although there is considerable variation between years. It is particularly worrying that that the MR on the central route appears to have increased substantially in 2016, which saw a relatively high number of arrivals (see Figure 2) . During this year, 24.6 out of 1,000 migrants (or one in 41) died on this route. The overall mortality rate was lowest in 2015, mostly because the increase in arrivals during that year was concentrated in the comparatively safer route from Turkey to Greece (see also Brian and Laczko, 2016) . Contrary to differences between routes, variations over time in the risk of crossing cannot be explained by geographic factors. While part of it may be the result of random fluctuation, changes in smugglers' strategies and operations are also likely to play a role. For example, it was suggested that the 2016 increase in mortality on the central route was related to the emergence of a militia-led smuggling model in Libya, which had even lower regard for migrants' lives (Heller and Pezzani, 2017) 9 . Moreover, mortality rates may be affected by European border policy, as we will discuss in the next section.
Border Deaths and Border Policy: What We Can Learn from the Most Recent Data
The opposing policy narratives outlined in the introduction are not abstract discourses: they inform and legitimize policy decisions. Such narratives provide "the assumptions needed for decision making in the face of what is genuinely uncertain and complex" (Roe, 1994: 51) . In the highly contentious debate over migrant deaths, proponents of each faction do not only mobilize moral affects, but also make claims about the expected relationship between policy interventions and migrant mortality. Two emblematic examples in this regard are the debates related to the supposed 'pull factor' emanating from Search and Rescue (SAR) missions and the effectiveness of deterrence measures such as the EU-Turkey agreement in preventing migrant death. In both cases, advocates of the 'humanitarian' and 'deterrence' perspectives have taken linearly opposed views, informed by their respective framing of the issue.
Our focus here is not on how such policy narratives are constructed or how they resonate with the institutional interests and traditions of the actors involved (Boswell et al., 2011; Carling and Hernández-Carretero, 2011) . We rather seek to evaluate the plausibility of their empirical claims, using the data on border deaths and mortality risks described previously. Before doing so, however, we would like to mention a number of caveats that apply when seeking to establish the association between particular border policies and mortality rates.
First, border deaths may result from a combination of border policies and a number of other factors, including smuggling operations as well as the root causes ("push factors") of forced migration (del Valle, 2016; den Heijer et al., 2016) . Since these other factors are difficult to measure and subject to constant change, it is almost impossible to disentangle their impact from that of the policy we are trying to assess. Second, border policy might have an impact on both the risk involved in crossing and the number of people attempting the crossing. The same policy (e.g. SAR) might prevent deaths (numerator), but also increase the number of attempted crossings (denominator), making its effect on the overall death toll difficult to isolate. Finally, migrants and smugglers may respond to deterrence efforts in ways that increase mortality risks, for example by diverting to longer and more dangerous routes (Mainwaring, 2016; Spijkerboer, 2007) . The combination of these factors makes it difficult to assess what the death toll would have been under a different policy regime.
Aware of these challenges, we provide descriptive statistics on border deaths and arrivals before and after specific EU border policy measures. In particular, we will focus on two of the most controversial policy decisions of the past few years: the decision to significantly reduce SAR operations in November 2014, and the EU-Turkey deal of March 2016.
Search and Rescue and the 'pull factor hypothesis'
A frequently heard argument from the 'deterrence' camp relates to the role of Search and Rescue (SAR) activities as a potential 'pull factor' for irregular migration (del Valle, 2016) . Several leading politicians, including senior EU leaders, have claimed that the presence of rescue boats close to the Libyan coast serves as a "magnet" or even a "bridge to Europe" (Anetzberger, 2014), tempting smugglers to send larger numbers of migrants in increasingly unseaworthy vessels, thereby increasing the overall death toll. Most recently this view was expressed by Frontexchef Fabrice Leggeri, although this time in relation to NGO rescue operations (Wintour, 2017b).
Humanitarian organizations have strongly criticised this claim, arguing that it is rather the insufficiency of SAR capacity that causes the large number of deaths:
"The argument that rescuing people and improving reception conditions will encourage more people to migrate to Europe is not only erroneous; it is also, above all, dangerous.
People fleeing war, human rights violations and extreme poverty will continue to attempt to reach Europe whether or not States try to stop them. Refraining from assisting them only results in more obstacles, more suffering and more deaths at sea and in transit" (Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2015: 53) .
In our analysis we focus on the central Mediterranean route, where most accidents and deaths take place. Over the past few years, we can identify three different phases in Search and Rescue activity in this area. Mare Nostrum (October 2013-October 2014) was a comprehensive SAR mission with an explicit humanitarian objective, managed by the Italian navy. During its operational period, the mission rescued over 156,000 people, often operating close to the Libyan coast (Cusumano, 2017: 92) . Heller and Pezzani (2016) provide a detailed reconstruction of how 'pull factor' arguments informed the EU's decision not to (co)fund an extension of Mare Nostrum, which eventually led to the discontinuation of Mare Nostrum and its succession by the new Frontex operation Triton. Triton was primarily a mission to combat crime and secure the EU's external borders, and not explicitly designed as a SAR mission (Tazzioli, 2016) .
Moreover, it had a much smaller budget and rescue area compared to Mare Nostrum, effectively creating a vacuum in SAR capability (Heller and Pezzani, 2016) . we would expect more arrivals and higher mortality risks in the high-SAR periods.
The findings (Figure 4) show that the number of arrivals in the low-SAR period was not lower than in the equivalent high-SAR periods, as predicted by the pull factor hypothesis. In fact, arrivals were slightly higher in the low-SAR period. Most importantly however, we can observe that at 27.9 per 1,000, the mortality rate was substantially higher in the low-SAR period (Triton I) than in the periods before (20.6) and after (17.9). The high mortality rate during Triton I is largely the result of two large accidents on 13 and 18 April 2015, with estimated casualties of 400 and 750 people respectively. However, it would not be appropriate to treat these accidents as outliers that were unrelated to the (absence of) SAR capacity. The excellent 'Death by Rescue' investigative report by the University of London's Forensic Oceanography department (Heller and Pezzani, 2016) In combination, these results strongly suggest that SAR operations reduce mortality risks (or conversely, the absence of SAR operations leads to more deaths), and have little or no effect on the number of arrivals Pezzani, 2016, 2017) .
While the negative relationship between SAR and mortality rates is intuitive, the lacking 'pull' effect on the number of attempted crossings can be explained by the nature of migration across the Mediterranean. Various studies have noted that 'push factors' in the countries of origin and personal aspirations play a far more important role in migrants' decision-making than the availability of SAR capacities, about which they generally have little or no information (Crawley et al., 2016; Squire et al., 2017) . Particularly in the case of Libya, a further push factor relates to violence and harassment at the point of departure, which drives migrants towards a sea exit regardless of the risks involved (Andersson, 2017).
The EU-Turkey agreement
Another controversial aspect of European border policy is the agreement between the EU and Turkey, which was implemented in March 2016. The agreement entailed that every refugee arriving in Greece from Turkey would be returned and in turn, a Syrian refugee would be directly resettled to the EU. In compensation, Turkey would receive a total of EUR 6 billion from the EU, as well as various political concessions. As Figure 2 shows, arrivals to the EU via the eastern route have been reduced to low level following its implementation, although some observers have argued this decrease would have occurred even in the absence of the agreement (Spijkerboer, 2016) 10 .
In spite of its questionable human rights implications, the European Commission explicitly The Turkey deal and related EU efforts to restrict irregular migration are on-going, and it is thus too early to draw any definite conclusions regarding its impact on mortality. It is possible that the agreement will collapse, or that Syrians and others fleeing the conflicts in the Middle East will find other (and potentially more dangerous) routes to enter the EU. Most importantly, it is paramount to remember that those who are prevented from crossing are generally not safe but remain subject to precarious and often lethal conditions in countries of transit (International Organization for Migration, 2017).
Conclusion
We started this study by describing how border deaths have come to play a pivotal role in the contentious debate surrounding the 'migration crisis' in Europe. In this debate, two diametrically opposed policy narratives have emerged, each of which are informed by fundamentally different interpretations of the crisis. Those employing a deterrence narrative primarily frame the crisis in terms of enforcement and security, and argue that closing the border is the most effective way to reduce the death toll. In contrast, the second narrative emphasises the humanitarian aspect of the crisis, pointing out the needs and basic rights of forced migrants and advocating for safe and legal passages as well as more extensive SAR as a means of preventing further deaths.
Thus far the deterrence narrative has prevailed, resulting in a number of controversial policy responses by the EU and its member states. Restrictive policies such as the EU-Turkey agreement and the more recent collaboration with the Libyan Coast Guard (Wintour, 2017a) were explicitly framed as measures to prevent further deaths, even though they have received strong criticism from human rights advocates.
In spite of the staggering number of deaths and the recurrent public debates, the academic community has devoted remarkably little effort to the quantitative analysis of border deaths.
Most of the extant literature discusses border deaths from a legal or critical theory perspective, generally without engaging the sources of information described in this article. Although we recognize the value of these approaches, we believe that both the academic and the public discourse would benefit from a more thorough and careful consideration of statistical data.
This study has provided descriptive evidence relating to a number of key social and political questions, and assessed the potential and limitations of the available data. In the critical research tradition, the quantification of human suffering is sometimes blamed for producing a technocratic distance to individual cases, which needs to be deconstructed in order to rehumanize political debates. While being aware of the numbing effect of abstract numbers, we believe that a systematic understanding of the scale and drivers of border death is indispensable to any informed discussion. In combination with case studies based on individual stories and experiences, quantitative data can make a powerful case for political action. Moreover, because numbers are already present in the public discourse-often in a selective or misleading wayit is important for migration scholars to assess their accuracy and place them in the appropriate context.
Keeping in mind the shortcomings of the data and the ongoing nature of the issue, some of the key conclusions and recommendations that can be derived from our analyses are:
1. The humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean continues unabated and is, given the current geo-political circumstances, unlikely to end anytime soon. The annual number of deaths has continuously increased in the period of observation, reaching its highest level ever recorded in 2016. In spite of an apparent reduction in 2017, continued monitoring and analysis of border deaths remains of utmost importance.
2. There are large and relatively stable differences in mortality rates between routes, with the central route consistently the most dangerous. Closing the Eastern route not only deprived war victims of their only way to safety, it also did little to bring down overall death tolls, because the Eastern route was a comparatively 'safe' route. Meanwhile, the diversion of Middle Eastern and Asian refugees to the far more dangerous central route remains a real possibility.
3. Search and Rescue operations can substantially reduce relative and absolute mortality, while the absence of SAR does not discourage crossings. In this light, the political backlash against humanitarian rescue operations that emerged in the spring of 2017 appears completely misguided.
4. Many have argued that fighting the root causes of forced migration and creating safe and legal passages are the only ways to effectively address border deaths (Castles, 2004; del Valle, 2016; Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2015) . We share this view, although it should be acknowledged that neither of these measures is likely to provide an immediate solution. As suggested by Heijer et al. (2016) and others, these long-term initiatives should therefore be combined with immediate action to expand SAR capacity and improve the situation of migrants and refugees in transit countries.
5. Most missing migrants are never found or identified, and little is known about their origins.
For families left behind, this creates additional pain and complicates the grieving process.
Against this background, we can only express our support for the call to establish a European Migrant Death Observatory (Grant, 2011; Last et al., 2016) In combination, our findings point out the continuing failure of European authorities to come up with a comprehensive response to the scenes of death and suffering at its southern border.
Torn between its legal and moral obligations towards refugees and its intent to maintain control over its external borders, the EU's border policy has been both inconsistent and ineffective.
More than 30,000 mostly young people have died in the space of sixteen years, a solution appears nowhere in sight.
Instead of addressing the fundamental causes of forced migration and the associated deaths, European authorities have capitalized on the 'migrant crisis' discourse to legitimize deterrence measures that are legally questionable, increased mortality risks and stimulated the smuggling economy, without achieving their stated objectives. It is important to remember that the overall number of migrants arriving on Europe's shores is relatively low, both in comparison to the European population and compared to the number of irregular migrants arriving through other means (Cosgrave et al., 2016) . Indeed, the 'migrant crisis' is primarily a crisis of Europe's own making .
Although the humanitarian narrative has helped to shift the debate towards the rights and needs of the migrants themselves, a number of critical migration scholars have questioned the framing of border deaths as a humanitarian crisis. For example, the images of overfilled rescue boats that are regularly distributed by humanitarian agencies may inadvertently contribute to the construction of migrants as an anonymous and helpless victims, rather than as autonomous individuals (Tazzioli, 2015) . Moreover, treating border deaths as a primarily humanitarian problem that needs to be 'solved' by the relevant authorities may obscure its structural and political causes (Andersson, 2017; Cuttitta, 2017) .
On a final note, to facilitate continued monitoring of border deaths and encourage evidencebased research and policymaking, we provide interested readers with direct links to the most recent data sources on an accompanying website (Link). Moreover, we provide a template for importing, formatting, analysing and visualizing this data in the widely used statistical software Stata (StataCorp, 2015) . (Mare Nostrum: Nov. 2013 -May 2014 , Triton I: Nov. 2014 -May 2015 , Triton II: Nov. 2015 -May 2016 . Mortality rates (right) based on the full periods (Mare Nostrum: Oct. 2013 -Oct. 2014 , Triton I: Nov. 2014 -May 2015 , Triton II: June 2015 -Dec.2016 
